Open-sourced geopolitical prediction runs using a two-stage LLM ensemble pipeline
The pipeline combines two established LLM ensemble techniques into a single grounded forecasting system. Each stage runs independently — when their probability estimates converge, it suggests genuine signal rather than averaging noise.
Inspired by Snowglobe (IQTLabs)
Monte Carlo actor simulation with a referee + per-actor control loop. Each actor commits privately and independently. A referee narrates the evolving world state between turns using authority-precedence conflict resolution. Actors see only referee-authored state and their own private memory — no cross-contamination.
Inspired by LLM Council (Karpathy)
Six analytical lenses (Neutral, Pessimistic, Optimistic, Blindsides, Probabilistic, Historical) deliberate via a 3-stage protocol: parallel independent answers, blind peer review, chairman synthesis. No cross-contamination between lenses until review stage.
Both stages are grounded with a frozen news bundle (Tavily search + ISW/RSS feeds) so every actor and every council lens reasons from an identical world state. All LLM calls are routed through OpenRouter to the same model. Stage A produces emergent outcomes from N agents reasoning from their own persona in a game-theoretic loop. Stage B produces calibrated probabilities from expert-style analytical reasoning. Neither stage has access to the other's reasoning during execution. When they converge on similar probability estimates, it provides evidence the pipeline is surfacing genuine signal.
10 April 2026 · 10 actors · 6 lenses · Claude Sonnet 4.5
Question: What is the probability of forced regime change in Iran — defined as the IRGC being removed from power and replaced by a non-autocratic government that formally recognises Israel and renounces eliminationism — within 1 week, 1 month, and 1 year?
Forced regime change remains highly unlikely. Despite 85% defence industrial base destruction and 92% public dissatisfaction, the IRGC maintains institutional cohesion. The most probable pathway involves cascading failures requiring 9-18 months to materialise.
9 April 2026 · 38 actors · 6 lenses · Claude Sonnet 4.5
Question: What is the probability that the two-week ceasefire announced on 8 April 2026 between Iran, the United States, and Israel holds at +24h, +72h, +1 week, and +1 month?
The council assessed the ceasefire as a tactical pause, not genuine de-escalation, with rapidly decaying survival probabilities. The 72-hour mark (April 11-13) was identified as the critical inflection point.
The most notable experimental finding: Stage A (actor simulation) and Stage B (analytical council) converged to within 6 percentage points on the critical 72-hour window — despite being completely independent processes with no shared reasoning.
All predictions are graded on a standard 4-point rubric as prediction windows close. Wire services (Reuters, AP) take precedence over opinion sources.
Run Score: 0.75 — 5 Correct, 1 Incorrect
| # | Window | Prediction | Outcome | Grade |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1.1 | 24h-1wk | Israeli operations continue at full intensity | IDF continued strikes through to April 8 ceasefire | Correct |
| 1.2 | 24h-1wk | Iranian proxy retaliations continue | Hezbollah maintained 55+ attacks/day | Correct |
| 1.3 | 1mo | Iranian ballistic missile capabilities degraded 50%+ | Coalition struck ~330/470 known launchers (70%) | Correct |
| 1.4 | 1mo | IDF maintains/extends buffer zone to Litani | IDF reached Litani River by March 24 | Correct |
| 1.5 | 1wk | March 27 deadline fails | No deal reached; war continued until April 8 | Correct |
| 1.6 | 1mo | No ceasefire holds before March 27 | Ceasefire reached April 8 — model assessed as improbable | Incorrect |
Prediction windows for the ceasefire durability and regime change runs have not yet closed. Accuracy will be assessed as ground truth becomes available.
| # | Date | Topic | Actors | Lenses | Model | Key Finding |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3 | 10/04/2026 | Iran forced regime change | 10 | 6 | Claude Sonnet 4.5 | <1% / 1-3% / 4-9% at +1wk/+1mo/+1yr |
| 2 | 09/04/2026 | Iran-Israel-US ceasefire durability | 38 | 6 | Claude Sonnet 4.5 | 22% chance ceasefire holds at +72h (sim: 28%) |
| 1 | 24/03/2026 | Iran-Israel-US conflict trajectory | -- | 6 | -- | 5/5 high-confidence predictions validated |